In Harris v. Mayorkas, No. 21-cv-1083 (GMH), 2022 WL 3452316 (D.D.C. Aug. 18, 2022), the court, inter alia, dismissed plaintiff’s hostile work environment claim asserted under title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.
After summarizing the applicable standard, the court applied it to the facts as follows:
Here, none of Plaintiff’s claims of discriminatory and retaliatory treatment are sufficiently severe—either individually or collectively—or pervasive to support her hostile work environment claim. To start, Plaintiff complains of a number of work-related actions by her supervisors, including restricting her responsibilities and limiting the meetings she could attend and the colleagues she could speak with; lowering her performance evaluations ; assigning her the same work goals as a prior year; imposing supervisory requirements on her emails and her computer use; threatening “worse consequences” if Plaintiff did not sign a performance improvement plan; providing only negative feedback during evaluations; imposing “unreasonable” and “impossible” deadlines; failing to “provide clear communications” or “timely meet” with her to discuss her performance plan for an upcoming year; denial of leave; and being required to work on days off and through lunch breaks. But courts in this Circuit “typically do not find these types of ‘work-related actions by supervisors’ to be sufficient for a hostile work environment claim.” Munro v. LaHood, 839 F. Supp. 2d 354, 366 (D.D.C. 2012) (dismissing Title VII hostile work environment claims predicated on, similar to this case, “placement on the [performance improvement plan]” and “receipt of unfavorable feedback”). That is because actions of the type Plaintiff alleges, including the exclusion from work teams, “the removal of important assignments, lowered performance evaluations, and close scrutiny of assignments by management [cannot] be characterized as sufficiently intimidating or offensive in an ordinary workplace context.” Nurriddin v. Bolden, 674 F. Supp. 2d 64, 94 (D.D.C. 2009) (dismissing Title VII hostile work environment claims premised on, similar to here, “disparaging remarks, criticisms of [plaintiff’s] work, and other negative comments”); see also Massaquoi v. District of Columbia, 81 F. Supp. 3d 44, 54 & n.10 (D.D.C. 2015) (dismissing Title VII hostile work environment claims where, as here, the plaintiff reported being “stripped of many of the duties of his position”).
The imposition of difficult workplace deadlines or threats of other personnel action are likewise insufficient to transform an uncivil work environmental into a hostile one. See, e.g., Morales v. Gotbaum, No. 10-cv-221, 2012 WL 13036867, at *10 (D.D.C. Apr. 17, 2012) (dismissing Title VII hostile work environment claims premised on, among other things, “personnel disputes … regarding work deadlines, the content of assignments, and work reports”); Newton v. Off. of the Architect of the Capitol, 839 F. Supp. 2d 112, 117 (D.D.C. 2012) (dismissing Title VII hostile work environment claims and noting that “ ‘threatened’ job related consequences for the employee’s refusals to meet workplace expectations did not demonstrate a hostile work environment pervaded by discrimination”). The same goes for Plaintiff’s claims of denial of leave, which apparently happened on more than one occasion. See Nurriddin, 674 F. Supp. 2d at 93–94 (granting a motion to dismiss Title VII hostile work environment claim premised in part on repeated denial of leave requests). On the other hand, Plaintiff’s allegations that she was asked to work on scheduled days off and through a lunch break are confined to a single day in June 2020. See ECF No. 17-2 at 4 (“On or about June 5, 2020, the Plaintiff’s new supervisor, Pamela Hubbard, required the Plaintiff to work on scheduled days off (no pay) and had to work through lunch.”). Such claims are neither sufficiently severe or pervasive to bolster her hostile work environment claim. See, e.g., Briscoe v. Costco Wholesale Corp., 61 F. Supp. 3d 78, 88 (D.D.C. 2014) (dismissing Title VII hostile work environment claim because the employer’s “denial of the requests for days off … did not create an objectively hostile environment as a matter of law”); Lancaster v. Vance-Cooks, 967 F. Supp. 2d 375, 391 (D.D.C. 2013) (dismissing Title VII hostile work environment claim premised in part on plaintiff’s claim, similar to this case, that he was “denied a lunch break once”); see also Schmitz v. Walgreens Co., No. 17-cv-80478, 2017 WL 9831637, at *2 (S.D. Fla. Nov. 28, 2017) (dismissing Title VII hostile work environment claims and concluding that “[a] denial either of breaks, days off and managerial training does not rise to the level of a hostile work environment”). Finally, being assigned the same work goals as a prior year and one’s supervisor failing to communicate clearly or timely meet with an employee to discuss future work is assuredly not the type of “severe” conduct actionable in a Title VII suit. Again, those “work-related actions by supervisors” are simply not sufficient to make out a hostile work environment claim. Munro, 839 F. Supp. 2d at 366. For these reasons, the work-related conduct Plaintiff alleges cannot sustain her hostile work environment claim.15
Further, Plaintiff also alleges a number of incidents of verbal harassment and generally rude and “greatly disrespectful” conduct by her supervisors, including episodes where her supervisor cut her off in conversations, disparaged her in front of colleagues, and “undeservedly gave praise to co-workers in front of Plaintiff” to humiliate her. She also says she was accused of being aggressive. These, too, are not of the severity required to sustain a hostile work environment claim, and courts in this Circuit have so held. Indeed, “the D.C. Circuit has held that workplace tribulations, such as ‘petty insults, vindictive behavior, and angry recriminations[,]’ are not actionable under Title VII.” Dieng v. Am. Insts. for Rsch. in Behav. Scis., 412 F. Supp. 3d 1, 15 (D.D.C. 2019) (alteration in original) (quoting Brooks, 748 F.3d at 1277–78). So, the rude and disrespectful behavior Plaintiff complains of also does not advance her hostile work environment claim. See, e.g., Dieng, 412 F. Supp. 3d at 14 (dismissing Title VII hostile work environment claims based on “denial of teleworking,” “yelling at [plaintiff] during staff meetings,” “ignoring [plaintiff] at those meetings,” and “constant questioning of [plaintiff’s] work”); Nurriddin, 674 F. Supp. 2d at 94–95 (dismissing Title VII hostile work environment claims premised on, amongst other conduct, disparaging remarks); Singh v. U.S. House of Representatives, 300 F. Supp. 2d 48, 54–57 (D.D.C. 2004) (dismissing Title VII hostile work environment claims based on the plaintiff’s allegations that her employer humiliated her at important meetings, screamed at her in one instance, told her to “shut up and sit down” in one instance, and was “constantly hostile and hypercritical” did not amount to a hostile work environment). And as to Plaintiff’s allegation that she was accused of being aggressive, a single such accusation of misconduct (assuming it is false) is certainly not severe or pervasive enough to make out a hostile work environment claim. Cf. Bartlette, 208 F. Supp. 3d at 326–27 (“[T]he court can envision a scenario where constant false accusations of misconduct,” coupled with other actions, “might be sufficiently severe and pervasive to constitute a hostile working environment.” (emphasis added)). To be sure, many of Plaintiff’s allegations unfortunately reflect an uncivil work environment that was no doubt difficult to navigate. But in this jurisdiction, “simply having a rude, harsh, or unfair boss is not enough for a hostile work environment claim.”
[Cleaned up.]
The court further rejected plaintiff’s attempt to “bootstrap” her alleged discrete acts of retaliation into her “broader” hostile work environment claim.