SDNY Explains Discriminatory Pay, Retaliation Pleading Deficiencies

In Motta v. Glob. Contract Servs. Inc., No. 15 CV 8555 (LGS), 2016 WL 2642229 (S.D.N.Y. May 4, 2016), the court dismissed plaintiff’s retaliation and discriminatory pay claims as insufficiently pled. While the court held that the complaint was deficient, its decision is nevertheless instructive as to what must be alleged in order to survive a motion to dismiss.

In this case, current and former telephone call center representatives sued their employer for employment discrimination, sexual harassment, and retaliation.

As to plaintiffs’ discriminatory pay claims, the court held that their complaint does not allege that plaintiffs are “paid less than their white or male counterparts at the Call Center.”

As to plaintiffs’ retaliation claims, the court explained:

With respect to Motta, the Complaint alleges: “Ms. Motta has complained about her discriminatory pay to her supervisors at GCS. Any time that Ms[.] Motta spoke up about the discriminatory pay, and requested a pay increase, she was either disciplined for unrelated arbitrary matters or moved to less desirable assignments to keep her quiet.” As to Lennon, the Complaint alleges that when she “complained about her discriminatory pay she was terminated for baseless reasons.”

The Complaint alleges no details in support of these women’s retaliation claims. For example, although each woman is alleged to have “complained” or “spoke[n] up about the discriminatory pay,” the Complaint does not state when any of these complaints were made, to whom they were made, or how long after each complaint the allegedly retaliatory act took place. Similarly, the Complaint asserts in a conclusory fashion that Motta was disciplined and moved to less desirable assignments, but does not allege what constituted the alleged discipline, or how the new assignments were “less desirable” in a way that made them materially adverse or reasonably likely to deter a person from engaging in protected activity. As to Lennon, the Complaint asserts that she was terminated after complaining of discrimination, but does not provide the dates of either her complaint(s) or termination, or anything else to support the inference that the termination was retaliatory.

The Complaint’s thin allegations of retaliation fail to assert nonconclusory factual matter sufficient to nudge its claims across the line from conceivable to plausible. GCS’s motion to dismiss the retaliation claims in Motta is therefore granted. (Emphasis added.)

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