In Nunez v. New York State Dep’t of Corr. & Cmty. Supervision, No. 14-CV-6647 JMF, 2015 WL 4605684 (S.D.N.Y. July 31, 2015), the court held that plaintiff – a parole officer – plausibly alleged sexual harassment under the New York City Human Rights Law, but not the New York State Human Rights Law.
Plaintiff alleged that her supervisor “subjected her to unwanted romantic advances and that, when she refused to engage with him socially and later filed an internal complaint, Lima and her co-workers both retaliated against her and created a hostile work environment.”
This case illustrates that the local/city law is broader than its state and federal (Title VII) counterparts. The court explained:
[The NYCHRL] does not require either materially adverse employment actions or severe and pervasive conduct in order to state a claim for sexual harassment. Instead, a focus on unequal treatment based on gender—regardless of whether the conduct is tangible (like hiring or firing) or not—is in fact the approach that is most faithful to the uniquely broad and remedial purposes of the local statute. Thus, although New York courts have held that the NYCHRL, like Title VII, does not operate as a general civility code, and that a defendant may avoid liability for acts that are nothing more than petty slights and trivial inconveniences, all that is [generally] required under the NYCHRL is that [Plaintiff] proffer evidence of ‘unwanted gender-based conduct.
Applying this standard, the court held that “[p]laintiff adequately alleges that she suffered unwanted gender-based conduct in the form of [her supervisor]’s persistent romantic overtures.”